The OECD's unemployment problem is largely concentrated among low-skilled workers. In this paper, four explanations of low-skilled workers' unemployment are examined: wage-setting institutions, employment regulation, globalization, and monetary policy. The analysis is based on pooled regressions for 21 affluent countries over the period 1991-2006. Our findings provide no support for the hypothesis that low-skilled workers' employment prospects are hindered by legal minimum wages or strict employment protection. Likewise, large wage inequality does not seem to be a necessary condition for countries to achieve low rates of lowskilled unemployment. In contrast, investment in active labour market policies pays off in form of less low-skilled unemployment. Additionally, low real interest rates are associated with significantly less low-skilled unemployment. Hence, low-skilled workers' job prospects seem enhanced by a combination of active labour market policies with a monetary policy that allows the economy to fully exploit its growth potential.
Introduction
The burden of unemployment mainly weighs on the shoulders of low-skilled workers in both Europe and North America. In 2006, the unemployment rate in the OECD stood at 10 per cent among the lowskilled as compared to 5 per cent among the medium-skilled and 4 per cent among the high-skilled (OECD, 2008) . While there seems to be a general trend towards the disaffection of low-skilled workers since the 1970s, large country differences persist within Western Europe. Hence, in 2006, 20 per cent of low-skilled workers were unemployed in Germany and 12 per cent in Belgium, but less than 5 per cent in the Netherlands and Norway (OECD, 2008) . Our paper's objective is to examine the determinants of these cross-country differences in the unemployment rate of low-skilled workers. The literature in labour economics and comparative political economy proposes a large array of culprits for low-skilled workers disproportionate unemployment rate.
We review and empirically analyze four different sets of explanations. A first set highlights wage-setting institutions and more particularly minimum wages and wage inequality. A second set emphasizes employment policy design and focuses on unemployment benefits, active labour market policies and employment protection legislation. A third set insists on globalization by highlighting the role of international trade and labour migration. A fourth and final set recalls the importance of the macro-economic context and, more particularly, of monetary policy.
These different explanations are first discussed and then examined on the macro-level for 21 economically advanced European and Anglo-Saxon countries. Based on OECD labour market data, we analyze the influence of labour market policies and institutions on unemployment rates of lowskilled workers for 4 four-year periods since German reunification 1991 until 2006. These pooled time-series cross-section regressions show no evidence for the hypothesis that low-skilled unemployment is fostered by legal minimum wages or by strict employment protection. Likewise, higher wage inequality or lower exposition to international trade do not seem to be associated with less unemployment among low-skilled workers in the OECD. In contrast, two hypotheses are supported by our data. Firstly, investment in active labour market policies seems to pay off in form of lower unemployment of low-skilled workers. Secondly, high real interest rates are associated with significantly higher unemployment rates among the low-skilled. Hence, our analysis suggests that lowskilled workers' job prospects are enhanced by a combination of active labour market policies at the micro-level with a monetary policy that allows the economy to fully exploit its growth potential at the macro-level.
Our paper is structured as follows. Section 1 starts out with a review of different explanations accounting for low-skilled unemployment. Section 2 then discusses methodological issues, presents the data and shows the actual extent of low-skilled unemployment in the 21 European and AngloSaxon countries of our sample. Section 3 presents the empirical results of our pooled regressions. In section 4, these findings are discussed in the light of a few countries' unemployment experiences over the last 15 years. Section 5 concludes by highlighting the implications of our findings for labour market policy.
Explanations for high unemployment among low-skilled workers
Schematically, explanations of low-skilled workers' unemployment can be divided into four sets of hypotheses, depending on whether their central argument lies on wage-setting institutions, employment policy design, globalization, or monetary policy. The theoretical foundations of these four sets of explanations shall be outlined in what follows.
Wage-setting institutions
Statutory minimum wages have regularly been accused of hampering low-skilled workers' employment prospects. In a perfectly competitive labour market, a minimum wage set above the market-clearing level is expected to produce unemployment. The minimum wage's effect should be felt most strongly among the two least productive employment categories: low-skilled and young workers. The reasoning is straightforward: if a country's wage floor exceeds low-skilled workers' productivity -the marginal product of their labour -, employers will not hire them. Minimum wages may thus price low-skilled workers out of the labour market. In this line, Siebert (1997: 45) maintains that 'a country that institutionally prohibits flexible wages at the lower end can be expected to have a low percentage of employment in low-paid jobs' and thus higher low-skilled unemployment.
Theoretical expectations as to minimum wages' influence on unemployment become less clear-cut once we make admission for firms' monopsony power. If firms possess some discretion in wage-setting -due to imperfect information or workers' inertia to change jobs -and are thus also wage-setters and not only wage-takers, a rise in the minimum wage does not necessarily increase unemployment of low-skilled workers (Bassanini and Duval, 2006: 75; Manning, 2003: 347) . There may thus be a certain degree of non-linearity in the employment response to minimum wages: positive effects occur for minimum wages below a certain level, job losses thereafter (OECD, 1998: 44) .
In most OECD countries, the structure of earnings is affected more strongly by collective bargaining than statutory minimum wages. Hence, the Scandinavian and German-speaking countries as well as Italy do not have a legal minimum wage, but a close-knit web of collective agreements setting minimum wages for different occupations and sectors. These wage floors should affect lowskilled unemployment in the same way as legal minimum wages: A high coverage rate with collective agreements moves wage formation away from a market solution and should -in a perfectly competitive labour market -threaten low-skilled workers' employment prospects (Siebert, 1997: 47) .
This argument is closely linked with trade union monopoly power: strong trade unions may push wages above market-clearing levels at the cost of lower employment. However, this effect should be mitigated if labour movements are dominated by exposed-sector unions, which have an interest in containing wage costs in order not to jeopardize the viability of their industries.
Concerning collective bargaining, theoretical expectations may again be more complicated once account is made for nonlinear relationships. Trade union influence on wage formation may primarily depend on the structure and coordination of collective bargaining. Thereby, extremes may work best: on the one hand, decentralized bargaining at the company level with weak unions may be employment-friendly, because it comes close to a market process. On the other hand, very centralized and coordinated bargaining across sectors may be beneficial for employment as well, because powerful unions act as encompassing organizations and internalize the employment implications of their wage agreements (Calmfors and Driffill, 1988; Layard et al., 2005) . Highly coordinated (and thus often centralized) bargaining may even produce better results in terms of real wage restraint and thus be more successful in minimizing the influence of adverse supply shocks on unemployment (Blanchard, 2006: 46; Kenworthy, 2002: 368; Traxler and Kittel, 2000) .
The detrimental effect of wage-setting institutions is often deduced from arguments focusing on skill-biased technical change (SBTC). The crucial argument is that the diffusion of information technology favours high skilled personnel over low-skilled labour. While computers substitute for low-skilled personnel in routine cognitive and manual tasks, they increase the demand for high-skilled employees in problem-solving and creative activities. Hence, SBTC puts pressure on workers situated at the lower end of the skill distribution. Whether this pressure translates into higher unemployment among low-skilled workers depends on a country's wage-setting institutions. Where wages are flexible, SBTC is not expected to increase unemployment, but should be accommodated through higher wage differentials (Krugman, 1994) . Where labour markets are highly regulated, the forces preventing the prevention of larger earnings' dispersion would instead result in higher unemployment among low-skilled workers (Iversen and Wren, 1998; Scharpf, 2000) .
Employment policy design
Employment policy is expected to primarily impact on low-skilled unemployment through unemployment insurance. Unemployment benefits affect work incentives, the reservation wage and labour productivity in multiple ways. On the one hand, more generous benefits increase unemployed workers' reservation wage and thus reduce their search intensity and willingness to accept job offers.
The probable effect is an increase in unemployment. On the other hand, this negative impact may be offset by better job matching: generous unemployment benefits give jobseekers more time to find an efficient match and thus both lower the likelihood of subsequent separations and increase work productivity (Baccaro and Rei, 2007: 538; Bassanini and Duval, 2006: 60; Gangl, 2004) . Whether the detrimental or beneficial effect of generous unemployment benefits prevail is thus an empirical question.
Theoretical expectations are less ambiguous with respect to the impact of benefit duration on unemployment. A longer benefit entitlement period lessens jobseekers' incentive to accept a job within a few months after job leave and thus increases the risk of jobseekers becoming trapped in long-term unemployment. This risk may be particularly large for low-skilled and young workers because of the small net difference between unemployment benefits and expected earnings (EspingAndersen, 2000: 74; Nickell and Bell, 1995: 41) .
Moreover, the negative impact of generous unemployment benefits may be offset by active labour market programs (ALMP) (Bassassini and Duval, 2006: 75) . ALMP are expected to reduce unemployment through three channels: firstly, employment services and individual case management increase the efficiency of the job search process; secondly, training programs improve unemployed workers' competencies and make them, often combined with hiring subsidies, more attractive to prospective employers; thirdly, job search monitoring and enforcement of work tests make the unemployed more willing to accept jobs and thus lower their reservation wage (Martin and Grubb, 2001; OECD, 2005) . Hence, ALMP -notably efficient job placement services and training programsare expected to decrease unemployment in general and low-skilled unemployment in particular.
Finally, several authors consider job protection rules to be at the core of labour market rigidities and the European unemployment crisis (Saint-Paul, 2004: 52; Siebert, 1997: 49) . During demand slumps, dismissal regulations restrict employers' ability to adjust the workforce. In deciding whether to hire new workers, employers will take into account the likelihood that firing costs will be incurred in the future. Higher dismissal costs in the form of strict employment protection legislation may thus have a negative impact on hiring and push up unemployment. Theoretical predictions become more ambiguous if we extend our analysis to an entire demand cycle. Higher employment protection decreases hiring rates in periods of rising demand, but reduces dismissals during economic downturns (OECD, 2004a: 76) . The two effects may cancel each other out with respect to unemployment.
Still, employment protection may affect job creation through a two-fold impact on wages: on the one hand, strict employment protection strengthens the wage bargaining power of employed insiders by making them less vulnerable to unemployment. On the other hand, strict job protection reduces flows in and out of unemployment and thus increases the share of the long-term unemployed.
Since firms do not consider these latter as valid substitutes for the employed, long-term unemployment affects wage formation only marginally and leads to a higher equilibrium unemployment.
International trade and migration
Rising international trade, in particular with emerging economies, may have weakened the labour market position of low-skilled workers in OECD countries. According to schoolbook economics, developed countries that are well endowed with skilled labour have a comparative advantage in the production of goods requiring a highly educated workforce. In contrast, developing countries that are well endowed with unskilled labour have a comparative advantage in the production of goods that make intensive use of less educated workers. Consequently, increased international trade between developed and developing countries may hamper the employment prospects of low-skilled workers in the OECD countries (Wood, 1995) .
Another aspect of globalization is increased labour migration. Immigrants augment a country's labour supply and may thus increase competition for jobs (Borjas et al., 1997) . Guest workers may reduce native workers' employment opportunities under the assumption that these two groups are substitutes in production. This assumption is not unrealistic for low-skilled workers: in some sectors and occupations, low-skilled native and low-skilled immigrant labour may come close to being interchangeable. Hence, a large influx of immigrants may -if wages do not rapidly adjust downwards -increase a country's low-skilled unemployment rate.
However, expectations are less clear-cut if immigration is analyzed within a macro-economic context. Explanations focussing on the economy's demand-side insist on the fact that immigration increases population and thus also leads to higher demand for goods and services and more jobs.
Unemployment should thus only rise if the displacement effect due to a larger pool of low-skilled labour is not compensated by a simultaneous increase in aggregate demand. Explanations insisting on the economy's supply-side even attribute immigration a positive impact on jobs: By amplifying labour supply, work immigrants increase an economy's productive capacity and thus enable it to grow faster and longer without running into inflationary pressures (Bentolilla et al., 2008) .
1 Accordingly, the theoretical expectations as to the impact of immigration on employment differ widely.
Monetary policy
A last explanation focuses on macro-economic policy and aggregate demand management. Unskilled workers are particularly sensitive to the economic context. This is due to two advantages that skilled workers possess over unskilled workers. Firstly, skilled workers can do many of the unskilled jobs.
Secondly, they possess specific skills and are thus more costly to replace. In a cyclical downturn and the associated fall in demand for labour, firms thus have an interest in 'hoarding' skilled workers. This means that the burden of adjustment is shifted to lower educated workers, who are more easily replaced than skilled workers once the recession is over (Nickell and Bell, 1995: 41; Gautier et al., 2002) . During a recession, unskilled workers are thus the first to be laid-off and the last to be reemployed.
If a recession lasts several years, low-skilled workers' cyclical unemployment may lead to structural unemployment. This persistence of cyclical unemployment -termed hysteresis by Blanchard and Summers (1986) -operates through the phenomenon of long-term unemployment. A slump in aggregate demand that lasts too long increases the number of long-term unemployed, whose job perspectives become increasingly grim as they face human capital devaluation, become stigmatized by potential employers and reduce their search activity as a result of repeated setbacks (Ball, 1999) . Cyclical unemployment is caused by a slump in aggregate demand which, in turn, is closely linked to monetary policy: Restrictive monetary policy in the form of high real interest rates depresses investment and consumption. Accordingly, an extended period of weak aggregate demandcaused, for example, by high or only slowly falling real interest rates -may not just increase current unemployment of low-skilled workers, but through the link with long-term unemployment, also their equilibrium unemployment (Baccaro and Rei, 2007: 540; Ball, 1999) . The central banks' setting of interest rates may thus have long-lasting effects on the labour market (Blanchard, 2005; Fitoussi et al., 2000) . A few words are needed to shed light on our dependent variable: the unemployment rate of unskilled workers. Some scholars suggest that the employment rate is a more meaningful indicator (Bradley and Stephens, 2007: 1489; Scharpf, 2000) . We do not share this view. Comparatively low employment rates may not necessarily imply poor labour market health, but be partly due toculturally and politically determined -married women's labour force participation. In contrast, high unemployment rates unambiguously point to the unsatisfactory functioning of the labour market (Kenworthy, 2002: 372) . Moreover, unemployment is of much greater relevance for people's individual wellbeing than is employment per se: micro-level evidence suggests that moves between work and unemployment have a much greater negative impact on people's life satisfaction than moves between work and inactivity (Winkelmann and Winkelmann, 1998: 70) . Not surprisingly then, governments keen to be re-elected fear high unemployment rates much more than low employment rates. Hence, there are theoretical reasons why we prefer unemployment over employment rates.
Data and evidence for low-skilled unemployment
However, empirically, this question is of lesser relevance as the two indicators are strongly correlated:
in 2006, the correlation coefficient between low-skilled unemployment rates and low-skilled employment rates in 29 OECD was -0.82.
We focus on low-skilled unemployment with the argument that affluent countries' unemployment problem mainly afflicts low-skilled workers. The argument's empirical basis is shown in table 2, displaying for the 21 countries in our sample the average unemployment rate of low-skilled, medium-skilled and high-skilled workers over the four-year period 2003-2006. 3 Besides giving a feel for the data, this table also shows that unemployment is much lower among workers with secondary and, above all, tertiary education than among unskilled workers. In 9 out of the 21 countries analyzed, the high-skilled unemployment rate is less than 3 per cent: in these countries, unemployment policy is primarily about how to get the low-and medium-skilled back to work. Even more so, unemployment is a problem mainly plaguing the low-skilled in Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. In these countries, the unemployment rate among both the medium and high-skilled stands at 3.5 per cent or less.
About here table 2
If we express the low-skilled unemployment rate as a multiple of the high-skilled unemployment rate, it clearly emerges that the low-skilled are comparatively more vulnerable in the labour markets of the Continental European countries. Here, they are 3.2 (Austria and Belgium) to 3.7 (Germany) times more likely to be unemployed than the high-skilled. The disparity between the lowskilled and the high-skilled unemployment rate is also substantial in the two Anglo-Saxon countries U.S. (where the ratio is 3.2) and Ireland (ratio of 2.7). In comparison, the gap in unemployment rates between low-skilled and high-skilled employees is somewhat smaller in the Scandinavian and, above all, the Mediterranean countries where the ratio of low-skilled over high-skilled unemployment amounts to 1.5 or less.
When looking at the evolution of low-skilled unemployment over time (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) 
Results of pooled regressions
We examine the impact of institutions and policies on low-skilled unemployment by estimating pooled time-series cross-section regressions. Since labour market institutions display very little variation over time, there is little point in looking at year-to-year movements (Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000: C19; Kenworthy, 2007: 348) . Instead, we divide our time period into 4 four-year subperiods: 1991-1994, 1995-1998, 1999-2002, 2003-2006 . Having 21 countries in our sample, this leaves us with 84
observations. 4 Dealing with pooled data, we need to account for the fact that observations from within a country are not independent. Not only institutions, also unemployment rates are sticky over time. We correct for this correlation within the observations of each country by calculating robust OLSregressions with Huber-White standard errors (see Breen, 2005: 131) .
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In our analysis, we follow Kenworthy's (2007: 345) recommendation for independent-variable centred research and start out with a series of very simple models where we enter, alongside a timeperiod control variable, only one explanatory variable at a time. These regressions on the low-skilled unemployment rate are shown in table 3. We briefly comment the results for each of the four sets of explanations, starting out with wage-setting institutions. Our data provide no evidence for a detrimental impact of countries' minimum wage levels on low-skilled unemployment: the coefficient has the opposite sign and is not statistically significant. This result is not surprising: Cross-country studies regularly find minimum wages in the OECD to be set at too low a level to affect employment of prime age adults (Bassanini and Duval, 2006; Layard et al., 2005; OECD, 1998; OECD 2003) . In most countries, collective bargaining is more consequential for wage-setting. However, over the period since 1991, our relatively crude measures of bargaining coverage and bargaining coordination are not associated, one way or the other, with low-skilled unemployment. We obtain the same result for union density: low-skilled unemployment seems not fuelled by high union density. This may be due to the fact that high union density tends to be linked with coordinated wage bargaining. While we do not find evidence for such a link (see regression results in table A.1 in the annex), studies based on data for earlier periods suggest that coordination of wage bargaining has a significant downward impact on unemployment (Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Bassanini and Duval, 2006) and thus cancel out the potentially detrimental influence of union density on unemployment (OECD, 2004b; Baccaro and Rei, 2007) . Finally, we find a significant relationship between wage dispersion and low-skilled unemployment. However, it runs counter to the theoretical expectation: countries and periods with greater wage differentials are not associated with less, but more unemployment among low-skilled workers. This correlation is primarily due to the three Scandinavian countries Denmark, Norway and Sweden plus the Netherlands, which have the most compressed wage structure in our sample and also feature low rates of low-skilled unemployment over the period under study.
When turning to the explanations focussing on employment policy design, we find no significant link between the OECD index of employment protection strictness and low-skilled unemployment. This result is in line with previous studies reporting that job protection legislation strongly influences a country's mix of employment between regular contracts, temporary contracts and self-employment, but does not affect the level of unemployment (Bassanini and Duval, 2006; Layard et al., 2005; OECD, 2004a) . In the same vein, we find no significant relationship between the two measures of unemployment benefits (the 1-year and 5-year replacement rates) and low-skilled unemployment. The finding that unemployment insurance generosity -the replacement rate during the first year after layoff -does not increase unemployment has been reported before (Baccaro and Rei, 2007; Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Nickell and van Ours, 2000) . Less expected is the absence of a link between low-skilled unemployment and long-term unemployment benefits. Benefit duration has regularly been singled out as one of the main culprits of persistent European unemployment (Ball, 1999: 207; Esping-Andersen, 2000: 79) .
About here table 3
An explanation of low-skilled unemployment strongly supported by our data is spending on active labour market programs (ALMP). 6 Attributing a larger share of GDP to ALMP (for a given rate of unemployment) seems to go along with consistently lower unemployment rates among the lowskilled. This beneficial impact of ALMP possibly explains why we do not find a detrimental influence for unemployment benefits: States with comparatively generous unemployment insurances such as the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands or Switzerland also spend more in terms of GDP on ALMP.
However, if we introduce the measures for 1-year and 5-year unemployment benefits into a regression alongside spending on ALMP, the latter remains strongly correlated with low-skilled unemployment.
In contrast, unemployment benefit levels still do not seem to matter (see table A.1 in the annex).
The third set of explanations focusing on globalization receives mixed empirical support.
During the period under study, there is no significant correlation between trade openness and lowskilled unemployment. Low-skilled workers are not more likely to be unemployed in countries and periods with more pervasive international trade than in economically more sheltered countries and periods. On the contrary, the regression coefficient (albeit not significant) suggests that high levels of trade openness are associated with better results in terms of low-skilled unemployment. A similar result is found with respect to migratory openness: higher levels of labour migration are significantly correlated with lower unemployment among low-skilled worker. This seemingly paradoxical finding of countries with a strongly positive migratory balance having less low-skilled unemployment is probably best explained by reverse causality: countries with thriving labour markets offer better job prospects and thus attract more immigrants than countries with high unemployment (Blanchflower et al., 2007). 7 Finally, the fourth explanations emphasizing monetary policy is clearly supported by our empirical evidence: Countries and periods with higher long-term interest rates are linked to significantly higher rates of low-skilled unemployment. Our finding is consistent with the argument made by Fitoussi et al. (2000: 260) that monetary policy in Continental Europe increased unemployment for most of the 1990s, for reasons having to do with the EMU, the Maastricht Treaty, and the tight-money policies instituted by the Deutsche Bundesbank to offset expenditure for German unification. After having fallen in disgrace in the 1980s and early 1990s, explanations of unemployment that emphasize demand-side factors seem to gain centre-stage again (see Ball, 1999; Blanchard, 2005; Solow, 2000) . One important question about monetary policy remains unanswered:
do high interest rates only affect cyclical unemployment or do they end up -if they remain high for too long a period -in increasing structural unemployment as well? Neoclassical theory pleads for the former interpretation. Cross-country empirical evidence points to the latter conclusion (Ball, 1999; Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000) . What is undisputed is that macroeconomic conditions are always filtered by labour market institutions. Except in non-existing textbook countries where prices and wages are perfectly flexible and adjust over night, negative shifts in aggregate demand always have an influence on jobs, leading to more or less deep scars in employment depending on a country's labour market institutions (Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Fitoussi et al., 2000) .
Accordingly, we estimate a further regression in which we integrate all explanatory variables together with real interest rates. 8 This allows us to determine the impact of an institution, having controlled for the tightness of monetary policy. The results shown in table 4 suggest that even if we control for real interest rates, the different measures of wage-setting (union density and bargaining coverage) and employment policy (unemployment benefits and job protection) do not significantly affect low-skilled unemployment. The two only determinants significantly linked with the unemployment rate of low-skilled workers are spending on active labour market programs and real interest rates. The same two factors have been singled out by Kenworthy (2003 Kenworthy ( : 1195 as the determinants explaining cross-country variation in employment growth.
In a last regression (model 2 in table 4), we estimate the joint impact of these two measures on low-skilled unemployment. A look at the models' explanatory power indicates that spending on ALMP and real interest rates explain about a quarter of variation in low-skilled unemployment across OECD countries between 1991 and 2006. The relative impact of both determinants on low-skilled unemployment is sizeable: The coefficient for interest rates indicates that a rise of one percentage point in long-term real interest rates increases the unemployment rate among low-skilled workers by one percentage point. It reminds us that disinflation policies -the tightening of monetary conditions -are costly in terms of unemployment (see Ball, 1999) . The coefficient for ALMP suggests that an increase in spending on ALMP by 10 per cent (for a given GDP and unemployment rate) reduces the low-skilled unemployment rate by one percentage point.
About here table 4
We run two robustness checks for these results. Firstly, we test for outliers by using the 'Jackknife' resampling technique which consists in dropping each country one at a time from our regression. Results from these regressions (shown in table 4) show that our findings are not driven by a single country: no matter which country we exclude from the regression, the association between real interest rates and ALMP on the one hand and low-skilled unemployment on the other remains statistically significant. Secondly, we examine whether the effect of ALMP and real interest rates holds true if the dependent variable is total unemployment instead of low-skilled unemployment (see table A.1 in the annex). The theory predicts that real interest rates -through its link with aggregate demand -are as relevant for total unemployment as for low-skilled unemployment. In contrast, active labour market programs are often specifically targeting the difficult-to-place unemployed and should thus be of greater relevance for low-skilled than total unemployment. The regression results show that interest rates and ALMP significantly affect total unemployment. However, as expected, the impact of ALMP spending is larger in reducing low-skilled than total unemployment.
Discussion of findings
We examine the plausibility of our findings by discussing them in the light of a few countries' unemployment experience since 1991. When looking at real interest rates, two very different cycles can be distinguished. In the early 1990s, restrictive monetary policy was one of the main causes for large unemployment increase in Western Europe. Between 1990 and 1992, most European countries had already entered into recession, whereas Germany's economy still soared as a consequence of the positive demand shock induced by reunification. When the German central bank finally put an end to the inflationary reunification boom in 1992 by raising the interest rate, the other European countries had to follow suit to avoid capital outflow and to stabilize their exchange rates. This further depressed aggregate demand and resulted in rising unemployment (Fitoussi et al., 2000: 260) . About here figure 1 What about the role of active labour market policies (ALMP)? In the 1990s, several countries overhauled their public employment services with the goal of improving the matching process between job seekers and firms. The reforms simultaneously aimed at giving the unemployed better job-search assistance and at tightening the conditions that apply to receive benefits. Denmark and Netherlands were the two EU-countries making greatest efforts to implement ALMP. In labour market reforms of the 1990s, both countries launched the principle of early activation of the unemployed:
Alongside stricter job-search monitoring and the obligation of program participation, this implied ensuring that every jobseeker gets offers of work or training within a year of becoming unemployed. A look at low-skilled unemployment rates suggests that this investment in ALMP was money well spent.
Between 1990 and 2000, Denmark almost tripled the share of GDP spent on ALMP per unemployed.
Over the same period, the low-skilled unemployment rate decreased from 14. 2 (1991) to 6.9 per cent (2000) and remained at or below this level for the following six years. Likewise, figure 2 shows that the increase on ALMP spending per unemployed also went hand in hand with significantly less lowskilled unemployment in the Netherlands. The greater reliance on active measures has been found to be the decisive determinant, alongside increased wage coordination (Visser, 1998) , of the spectacular reduction in Dutch unemployment since the mid-1980s (Nickell and van Ours, 2000: 166) .
About here figure 2 
Conclusion
This paper has started out from the observation that the OECD's unemployment problem concerns, to a large extent, low-skilled workers. Accordingly, the objective has been to review and test different Particularly noteworthy is the absence of an empirical link with unemployment for three institutions. Firstly, the data provide no support for the hypothesis that strict employment protection goes along with higher unemployment among the low-skilled. Secondly, we find no evidence for the assumption that low-skilled unemployment is linked to the level of legal minimum wages. Thirdly, this result is further substantiated by the finding that higher wage inequality is not associated with less unemployment among low-skilled workers -if anything, the contrary applies. Our data thus indicate that large wage differentials are not a necessary condition for countries to obtain low unemployment among the low-skilled. Added to the missing empirical link between legal minimum wages and unemployment, this result throws serious doubt on the frequently echoed expectation that postindustrial economies can only achieve full employment if they open their wage structure downwards in order to create low-paid service jobs (Krugman, 1994; Siebert, 1997 , Scharpf, 2000 . The insistence on greater wage differentials for the solution of the modern 'service trilemma' seems exaggerated (Iversen and Wren, 1998). 9 While these results are in stark contrast with the recommendations that Europe's unemployment problem should be resolved through a reduction in minimum wages, an increase in wage dispersion and a weakening of job protection (Siebert, 1997; St. Paul, 2004) , they confirm the findings made by Stephen Nickell and Richard Layard ten years ago: 'time spent worrying about strict labour market regulations, employment protection and minimum wages is probably time largely
wasted ' (1999: 3029) . In view of these results, the vehemence with which many economists and state officials insist on the necessity to deregulate the labour market is all the more surprising, as these reforms -while probably not very efficient -are socially highly divisive (Solow, 2000: 13) .
We conclude our paper by discussing the two hypotheses that receive support from our data.
Firstly, investment in ALMP seems to pay off in form of lower unemployment of low-skilled workers.
Secondly high real interest rates over an extended period are associated with significantly higher unemployment rates of low-skilled workers. Hence, the combination of efficient job services, training programs and job-search controls with a monetary policy that allows the economy to fully exploit its growth potential seems to lead to lower unemployment of the low-skilled. 10 A good labour market outcome may thus be the result of the coordinated use of instruments on the micro-and macroeconomic level. On the micro-economic level, a strong nexus between active labour market policies and the unemployment benefit system seems to contribute to enabling people to move from welfare to work (Nickell and Layard, 1999) . On the macro-economic level, monetary policy should be used to support aggregate demand to shorten recessions. Its role is thus to avoid a persistent rise in unemployment (hysteresis) and, more generally, to take advantage of opportunities to expand the economy whenever inflationary pressure is weak (Solow, 2000: 9) . In other words, ALMP seems an efficient micro-economic measure to make sure that jobseekers are willing to work, while expansive monetary policy creates a macro-economic context which effectively enables jobseekers to find work. Spending on ALMP (as % of GDP, divided by u) Low-skilled unemployment rate in %
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